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I.  Introduction 
Few things are as ingrained in Americans’ daily lives as the Internet.  
The Internet, a one-stop source for information, communication, and 
entertainment, has supplanted the old media that came before it such as 
books, telephones, fax machines, and television for many people.  Yet the 
Internet is an incredibly nebulous thing, a network of various private 
networks the regulation of which is currently even more amorphous.  A 
recent decision of the D.C. Circuit, which has national effect, has rendered 
the traditional model of the Internet subject to upheaval.  The fundamental 
principle in question, so-called “net neutrality,” stands for the idea that 
Internet providers must treat all traffic equally.  Blocking and preferential 
treatment of certain Internet content providers (websites) was disallowed 
under the now-vacated regulatory regime of the Federal Communications 
Commission (“F.C.C.”)’s Open Internet Order.  Now, however, Internet 
providers are essentially free to force various services and websites like 
Netflix and even Google to pay a fee if they want to be made available for 
subscribers of the Internet provider’s service, a cost that is likely to be 
passed on to consumers. 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the reasoning behind the 
holding in Verizon v. F.C.C. and examine whether the absence of net 
neutrality or an open Internet is good public policy.  Part II of the Article 
provides a brief summary of the facts and holding of the case, followed by 
an explanation of the legal background and context of the regulation in 
question.  Part III provides an in-depth analysis of the court’s reasoning and 
how that reasoning differed between the majority and the dissent.  Part IV 
analyzes the court’s holding, first from a technical legal standpoint and 
second from a public policy standpoint.  The analysis invokes questions of 
administrative statutory authority, the appropriate nexus of administrative 
regulation and antitrust, whether the absence of mandated net neutrality is 
good public policy in terms of potential anti- and pro-competitive effects, 
and what the future may hold for the Internet.  The Article takes the 
position that the court’s decision was appropriate in its result for legal 
reasons, yet nevertheless opens the door to potential market failures in the 
future. 
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II.  Verizon v. F.C.C. Marks the End of an Era 
Telecommunications behemoth Verizon Communications, Inc. 
(“Verizon”) brought this petition for judicial review and notice of appeal of 
the F.C.C.’s Open Internet Order of 20101 (“Order”).2  Verizon sought to 
vacate the Order, which imposes anti-blocking, anti-discrimination, and 
disclosure requirements on providers of broadband Internet service.3  The 
Commission’s stated intent was to preserve the practice of “net 
neutrality”4—referred to as “Internet openness” in the Commission’s 
terminology—whereby broadband Internet service providers must treat all 
information that passes over their networks equally without discriminating 
or censoring based on source or content.5  Although heard before an 
appellate court, this was a case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit exercised its unique original jurisdiction and 
authority of direct review over the orders and regulations of federal 
independent agencies, and therefore there was no lower court disposition.6  
Verizon challenged the Open Internet Order on multiple grounds, namely 
that the Commission had exceeded its allotted statutory authority, that the 
rules imposed were “arbitrary and capricious” because they were not 
supported by substantial evidence, and, most significantly, that the Order 
was in contravention of “statutory provisions [that] prohibit[ed] the 
Commission from treating broadband providers as common carriers.”7 
The court found that the Commission had established valid affirmative 
authority to enact measures such as the one at bar encouraging the 
deployment of broadband infrastructure.8  Moreover, the majority found the 
Commission had reasonably interpreted Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 as giving the Commission authority to 
regulate how broadband providers treat Internet traffic.  It also found that 
the Commission’s justification for the rules, namely that they would 
facilitate the continued innovation driving the explosive growth of the 
 
    1.  In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 17905 (2010). 
 2.  Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  This term was coined by Columbia Law Professor Tim Wu and is the term most 
commonly used by the media (and this Article) for the Commission’s concept of “internet 
openness.”  Jeff Sommer, Defending the Open Internet, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2014). 
 5.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628. 
 6.  See 47 U.S.C. § 402(a),(b) (2012) (delegating judicial review authority of F.C.C. orders 
and decisions to the D.C. Circuit). 
 7.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 634. 
 8.  Id. at 628. 
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Internet, as similarly reasonable and “supported by substantial evidence.”9  
However, even though the majority found that the Commission was 
authorized to make these rules, the Order contravened one of the 
Commission’s earlier rulings that expressly exempted information service 
providers from treatment as common carriers.10  The authorizing statute 
granted the Commission the authority to impose antidiscrimination rules on 
only those providers that could be classified as common carriers, and 
because the Commission had previously made the determination that 
broadband Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) were not common carriers 
but instead were information service providers, the Commission was 
estopped from nevertheless treating them as common carriers.11  
Accordingly, the court vacated the antidiscrimination and anti-blocking 
portions of the Open Internet Order.12 
III. A History of the Internet and Its Regulation 
Part III will provide the necessary background to understand the issues 
and parties at hand in this dispute, including an overview of how the 
intricate yet amorphous group of interrelated networks called the Internet 
operates.  It also looks at the level of deference normally given to 
administrative interpretations of statutory authority, gives a brief history of 
F.C.C. Internet regulation, and provides a detailed look at the Open Internet 
Order being challenged. 
A. The Internet Marketplace 
Judge Tatel’s opinion in Verizon v. F.C.C. summarizes the parties 
involved in the Internet as backbone networks, broadband providers (i.e. 
those that provide the “last mile” network over which end users access 
information, like Verizon or Comcast), edge providers (i.e. content 
providers like Google or Facebook), and end users.13  Using what he admits 
to be an oversimplified example, Judge Tatel describes the nexus of these 
parties as such: 
 
 9.  Id.  Senior Circuit Judge Silberman wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part that took issue with the supposedly substantial evidence the Commission put 
forth purporting to show that such regulation was necessary to promote the development of 
broadband and prevent a harmful market failure, dismissing the claims as “sheer speculation.”  Id. 
at 663 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
 10.  Id. at 628. 
 11.  Id. at 655–56. 
 12.  Id. at 628. 
 13.  Id. 
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when an edge provider such as YouTube transmits some sort of 
content—say, a video of a cat—to an end user, that content is broken down 
into packets of information, which are carried by the edge provider’s local 
access provider to the backbone network, which transmits these packets to 
the end user’s local access provider, which, in turn, transmits the 
information to the end user, who then views and hopefully enjoys the cat.14 
This example illustrates how the ISPs and backbone providers act as 
intermediaries between end-user subscribers and content sources (feline-
oriented and otherwise).  It is this relationship between broadband 
providers and content providers that concerns advocates of net neutrality. 
The standard by which Internet service can be considered “broadband” 
has evolved over the years as technology has progressed.15  The 1996 
Telecommunications Act defined broadband as Internet service furnished 
with sufficient speed to enable users to “originate and receive high-quality 
voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any 
technology.”16  In 1999, the Commission defined the minimum threshold 
for meeting this requirement as 200 kilobytes per second (“kbps”)—fairly 
slow by today’s standards.17  Shortly before implementing the Order in 
2010, the Commission determined that 200 kbps was inadequate for the 
modern needs of consumers, who often stream high-quality video while 
also browsing the web.18  Accordingly, the Commission raised the 
minimum threshold for broadband to four megabytes per second (“mbps”) 
for downloads and one mbps for uploads.19 
B. The APA and the Chevron Test of Administrative Deference 
The disposition on whether a regulation is valid inevitably involves a 
question of administrative deference.  There are two separate but 
overlapping authorities to which a court may look when determining 
whether a federal agency’s regulation is a valid use of the agency’s 
statutory authority: the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”)20 and the 
test outlined by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
 
 14.  Id. at 629. 
 15.  Id. at 640. 
 16.  47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2012). 
 17.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 640. 
 18.  Id. at 640–41. 
 19.  Id.  This increased minimum threshold made the Order easier to justify because it 
meant that a smaller percentage of Americans could be considered to have access to broadband.  
See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
 20.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
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Defense Council, Inc.21  The APA instructs courts reviewing the validity of 
regulations to determine whether the promulgating agency’s actions were 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”22  The Chevron inquiry involves asking whether 
Congress has directly spoken on the precise issue and, if it has not or if the 
statute is ambiguous, to determine whether the agency’s answer of that 
question is a permissible construction of the statute.23 
C. Jurisdiction and Regulations of the F.C.C. 
The Communications Act of 1934 created the F.C.C. with the purpose 
of executing and enforcing federal communications law and regulating 
interstate communication without discrimination based on the traditionally 
protected classes, among other considerations.24  The enacting legislation 
states that the provisions of the chapter “shall apply to interstate and 
foreign communication by wire or radio . . . and to all persons engaged 
within the United States in such communication or such transmission by 
radio.”25  Title II of the Communications Act also sets forth regulations for 
any carrier or transmitter of communications that could be considered a 
common carrier.26 
Common carriers are defined somewhat circularly as “any person [or 
entity] engaged as a common carrier for hire, in . . . communication by wire 
or radio” except those expressly excluded and not including radio 
broadcasters.27  Classification as a common carrier is accompanied by an 
affirmative duty “to furnish such communication service upon reasonable 
request therefor,” and also a requirement that “all charges, practices, 
classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such 
communications service . . . be just and reasonable.”28  In other words, a 
telecommunications provider that the Commission deems to be a common 
carrier may not discriminate between users of its service and must charge 
reasonable prices.  For example, a phone company given common carrier 
status cannot refuse to complete the calls of some customers, but not 
others; it must treat all phone traffic equally. 
 
 21.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 22.  Verizon, 740 F.3d  at 635 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)). 
 23.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 24.  47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (expressly providing protection from “discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex”). 
 25.  47 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 26.  47 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2012). 
 27.  47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012). 
 28.  47 U.S.C. § 201 (2014). 
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Although Congress undoubtedly did not contemplate the massively 
complex system that is the modern World Wide Web when it enacted the 
legislation in 1934, it seems clear that the Internet falls within the 
Commission’s stated jurisdiction encompassing all “interstate and foreign 
communications by wire or radio.”29  Indeed, since the Internet’s inception, 
the Commission has promulgated regulations over the various players in 
the Internet marketplace.30 
One of the first such efforts to govern the Internet came in 1980, when 
the Commission adopted what would be called the Computer II regime.31  
The Computer II rules drew a distinction between “basic” and “enhanced” 
services, with the former subject to common carrier regulation and the 
latter given no such restrictions.32  Basic services were defined as those that 
involved the pure or bare transmission of customer-supplied information 
(e.g., telephone service), while enhanced services were defined as those 
which involved computer processing applications for deciphering 
transmitted applications.33  Thus, because connecting an end user to the 
Internet clearly requires computer-processing applications, under the 
Computer II regime, ISPs were providing “enhanced” services and were 
not subject to regulation as common carriers.34 
The next era of Internet regulation and classification began in the mid-
1990s with the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.35  The 
1996 Act replaced the basic versus enhanced services distinction with a 
parallel distinction between telecommunications carriers—equivalent to 
basic carriers and subject to common carrier regulation—and information-
service providers equivalent to enhanced-service providers not subject to 
common carrier regulation.36  Beyond merely altering the Commission’s 
nomenclature, the 1996 Act also extended common carrier regulation to 
Digital Subscriber Line (“DSL”) services, at least as to the transmission 
facilities used.37 
 
 29.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 640 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)). 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  Id. at 629. 
 32.  See In re Amend. of Sec. 64.702 of the Commission’s Rul. and Regs., 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 
387 ¶¶ 5–7 (1980) (“Second Computer Inquiry”). 
 33.  Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 629-630 (citing Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 420 
¶¶ 96–97). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 36.  Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 630. 
 37.  Id.  DSL services furnish broadband over telephone wires.  Id. at 630.  DSL providers 
could exempt their Internet access services from common carrier restrictions as being separate 
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And yet, when the Commission was faced with the equivalent 
question of whether cable broadband providers could be considered 
information service providers four years later, it found in the affirmative.38  
This was true even where cable providers operated the “last-mile” 
transmission facilities, because the Commission reasoned that the cable 
companies were providing “single, integrated information service[s].”39  
This finding, ostensibly incongruent from the Commission’s classification 
of DSL providers, completely exempted cable broadband operators from 
common carrier regulation.40  The Commission later harmonized treatment 
of all broadband providers however, declaring them to be information 
services not subject to common carrier regulations.41  Even so, the 
Commission maintained it had the right to intervene with broadband 
providers’ network management even in the absence of common carrier 
status if it saw ISPs violating the Commission’s stated intention of 
preserving and promoting the “open and interconnected nature of the public 
Internet.”42 
In 2008, the Commission exercised this power in the form of an order 
dictating bandwidth management practices and disclosure to cable 
broadband provider Comcast after several of the company’s subscribers 
complained that Comcast was interfering with customer’s ability to use 
certain peer-to-peer networking applications such as BitTorrent.43  While 
the Commission claimed to be invoking the “ancillary jurisdiction” 
afforded to it to execute the functions of the Communications Act, the D.C. 
Circuit Court rejected this justification, finding that the Commission had 
failed to identify any “grant of statutory authority to which the Comcast 
Order was reasonably ancillary.”44  Accordingly, the Commission’s order 
 
from the transmission facilities themselves if and only if they operated them through a separate 
affiliate or quasi-independent ISP.  Id. at 631. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id.; see also In Re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & 
Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 4798, 4824 ¶ 41 (2002).  This apparent inconsistency in treatment 
between DSL and cable broadband providers was challenged before the Supreme Court in 2005, 
and the Court upheld the classification, reasoning that the Commission was entitled to deference 
in its interpretation of an ambiguous statute.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005); see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2012). 
 40.  Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 631. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 631–32 (quoting In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 ¶ 4 (2005)). 
 43.  Id. at 632 (citing In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008)). 
 44.  Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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was vacated.45  It was in the wake of this defeat that the Commission 
adopted the Open Internet Order that became the subject of Verizon’s 
challenge. 
D. The Open Internet Order 
The Open Internet Order, adopted in 2010, set forth various 
prophylactic rules on broadband providers for the stated purpose of 
“incorporat[ing] longstanding openness principles that are generally in line 
with current practices.”46  Some of the requirements applied to both fixed 
broadband providers (traditional DSL and cable broadband employing 
fixed endpoints and stationary equipment) and mobile broadband (e.g., 4G 
Internet service for smartphones), while some applied only to fixed ISPs.47  
The requirements were threefold: public disclosure and transparency 
mandates for both types of providers, anti-blocking proscriptions on both 
types of providers, and anti-discrimination prohibitions on fixed providers 
only.48 
The disclosure requirements assured that the public would have access 
to information regarding network management practices, performance, and 
commercial terms of the company’s Internet service.49  The anti-blocking 
requirements prevented broadband providers from blocking lawful 
applications and content—or content that competes with the broadband 
provider’s other services—subject to “reasonable network management.”50  
Lastly, the antidiscrimination requirements imposed on fixed broadband 
ISP’s, but not mobile operators, forbade unreasonable discrimination in 
transmitting lawful Internet traffic.51 
The Commission averred that it had authority to make these 
regulations by citing a provision of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that 
directed the Commission to encourage the deployment of broadband.52  
With what Verizon characterized as a “triple cushion shot,”53 the 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  25 F.C.C.R. at 17907 ¶ 4. 
 47.  Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 633. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. (explaining that “reasonable network management” is defined as “practices designed 
to ensure network security and integrity, address traffic that is unwanted by end users, and reduce 
or mitigate the effects of congestion on the network”). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 634; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a), (b) (2014). 
 53.  Id. at 659.  The “triple cushion shot” metaphor refers to a particularly convoluted trick 
shot in billiards whereby the cue ball rebounds off three different cushions before hitting its 
target. 
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Commission reasoned that net neutrality would spur investment among 
content providers, which in turn would lead to increased demand for 
broadband, thus encouraging increased investment in broadband 
infrastructure and ultimately leading to further innovation by content 
providers.54  The Commission feared that a lack of regulation would allow 
broadband providers to disrupt this “virtuous cycle of innovation” by 
preventing end users from accessing all content providers and vice versa, 
thus stifling the content provider’s ability to innovate.55  Compelling as this 
question of public policy is, it was largely sidestepped by the majority in 
Verizon.56 
IV. The Reasoning Behind the Verizon v. F.C.C. Decision 
The court averred that its task was not to assess the wisdom of the 
rules, but rather to assess whether the Commission could demonstrate “that 
the regulations fall within the scope of its statutory grant of authority.”57  
The court organized its opinion to first address Verizon’s argument that the 
Commission lacked affirmative statutory authority to assert the Open 
Internet Order and further that the rules were arbitrary and capricious.58  
Next, the court turned to Verizon’s argument that, by treating a type of 
service provider the Commission had previously determined not to be a 
common carrier as a common carrier, the Commission contravened a 
statutory mandate.59  Finally, in a concurrence in judgment and dissent in 
part, Judge Silberman detailed the authority inquiry within an antitrust 
framework.60 
A. A Question of Statutory Authority 
In dismissing Verizon’s argument that the Commission lacked 
statutory authority to promulgate the regulations, the court looked to 
Section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which provides that the 
Commission should encourage the deployment of advanced 
telecommunications capability (i.e., broadband) to all Americans and use 
 
 54.  Id. at 634. 
 55.  Id. at 644–50.  Whether this fear was justified remains to be seen; two of the F.C.C.’s 
commissioners even dissented to the imposition of the Order based in part on the belief that the 
regulations might actually stifle innovation rather than encourage it.  Id. at 634. 
 56.  Id. at 628–59. 
 57.  Id. at 634–35. 
 58.  Id. at 635. 
 59.  Id. at 649. 
 60.  See id. at 659. 
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regulating methods that remove barriers to investment.61  This section 
further provides that if the Commission finds broadband is not being 
deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely manner, it may take 
immediate action to accelerate deployment by removing barriers to 
infrastructure investment and promoting competition.62  Verizon contended 
that these provisions of the 1996 Act should be considered mere 
congressional statements of policy and, alternatively, that even if the 
provisions did grant the Commission authority, the particular regulations 
were not reasonable.63 
In determining whether the Order fell within the Commission’s 
jurisdiction, the court looked to both the APA64 and the test outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Chevron65 governing the deference given to federal 
agencies when they interpret an ambiguous statutory provision.66  The court 
observed that if the Commission’s interpretation of the statute represented a 
reasonable resolution of statutory ambiguity, then under Chevron the court 
must defer to that interpretation, even if that interpretation involves an 
agency determining the scope of its own jurisdiction.67 
The court next discussed Verizon’s contention that the Order 
represented an unreasonable departure from prior policy, and in doing so 
discussed the Advanced Services Order, which was vacated by the court in 
the earlier Comcast decision.68  Under the APA, an administrative agency 
normally must acknowledge and advance reasons for a change in policy.69  
Nonetheless, the court found it had no reason to find that the Commission 
had ignored its prior interpretation of the relevant statute or had failed to 
provide a reasoned explanation for its changed interpretation.70  As prior 
cases had observed,71 a new interpretation of a statute that is contrary to an 
agency’s initial interpretation cannot be rejected simply because it is new.72  
Instead of dwelling on past interpretations, the court chose to focus on 
whether the Commission’s current interpretation of Section 706(a) as a 
 
 61.  47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012). 
 62.  Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 635; 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (2012). 
 63.  Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 635. 
 64.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 65.  Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 66.  Verizon, 740 F.3d 623 at 636. 
 67.  Id. at 635. 
 68.  Id. at 636. 
 69.  Id. (citing F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)). 
 70.  Id. at 636–37. 
 71.  See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 697 (2005). 
 72.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 636. 
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grant regulatory authority was reasonable and answered in the affirmative 
that it was.73 
The Act’s language, encouraging the deployment of broadband and 
removal of barriers to infrastructure investment, could easily be interpreted 
as a mere congressional statement of policy as Verizon suggested, but 
could just as easily be read to grant the Commission actual authority.74  In 
finding the Commission’s interpretation reasonable, the court observed that 
the 1996 Act was passed against the backdrop of the Commission’s long 
history of subjecting ISPs to common carrier regulation.75  Likewise, the 
court found it had no reason to believe from the legislative history that 
Congress would not have delegated such decisions to the Commission.76  
While recognizing that Congress would likely not have intended to grant 
the Commission limitless authority, the court nevertheless concluded that 
the requirement that the provisions be proven to fulfill a specific statutory 
goal was a sufficient limitation.77 
The court next turned to the question whether Section 706(b) of the 
Act granted the Commission authority to take action.78  Deferring to the 
Commission’s interpretation, the court found that it did.79  In a departure 
from its previous conclusions, the Commission made the necessary 
determination that broadband was not being deployed to all Americans in a 
reasonable and timely manner in 2010.80  The catalyst for this 
determination, however, was sparked by the Commission’s own decision to 
raise the minimum threshold for what constitutes “broadband.”81  Although 
the court recognized the timing of this raised threshold and subsequent 
determination that broadband was not reaching enough Americans was 
“suspicious,” the timing alone did not render it unreasonable or arbitrary.82  
Once this determination had been made, it was not unreasonable, in the 
court’s view, for the Commission to exercise its apparent authority under 
 
 73.  Id. at 637. 
 74.  Id. at 637–38. 
 75.  Id. at 638. 
 76.  Id. at 639. 
 77.  Id. at 640. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id.  Section 706(b) requires the Commission to find that “broadband deployment to all 
Americans is not reasonable and timely” as a prerequisite to invoking the section’s grant of 
authority to take immediate action to accelerate the deployment of broadband.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 641.  See also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
 82.  Id. at 642. 
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Section 706(b).83  In a related query, the court similarly rejected Verizon’s 
alternative theory that, even if the Commission did have authority, the 
specific rules exceeded that authority’s scope.84 
The court further discussed how broadband providers have both the 
incentive and the means to discriminate between content providers.85  The 
court agreed with the Commission’s observation that broadband providers, 
which often also operate cable television and telephone services, do have 
an incentive to block or otherwise interfere with third-party Internet 
services that could compete with them in those other arenas.86  Likewise, 
ISPs have incentives to accept fees from content providers for either 
granting them prioritized access to end users or for blocking other 
competing content providers, and Verizon did not contest that it had the 
technical and economic ability to carry out such blocking and 
discrimination.87  Finally, the court recognized that because end users 
typically receive broadband from a single provider, that provider “functions 
as a terminating monopolist with power to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to [content] 
providers.”88  While this does leave consumers with the option of merely 
switching broadband providers, they may be reluctant to do so given high 
switching costs or other considerations.89  Moreover, the majority found 
that the number of providers to which a dissatisfied consumer may switch 
is extremely limited in most parts of the country.90 
Verizon’s final contention as to the public policy wisdom of these 
regulations was that any benefit they give to content provider innovation 
and consequential demand for broadband infrastructure would “be 
outweighed by the diminished incentives” broadband providers would have 
to invest in infrastructure as result of the limitation in business models ISPs 
may use.91  The court decided that there was insufficient information to 
settle the regulatory issue, and thus it was up to the Commission to exercise 
its judgment based on the available information to make a policy 
conclusion.92  The court found that the Commission had offered a rational 
 
 83.  Id. at 641. 
 84.  Id. at 642-44 (explaining the court did not believe the regulations strayed too far beyond 
the “paradigm case” likely contemplated by Congress when it supposedly granted such authority). 
 85.  Id. at 645. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 645–46. 
 88.  Id. at 646. 
 89.  Id. at 646–47. 
 90.  Id. at 647. 
 91.  Id. at 649. 
 92.  Id. 
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connection between the available facts and the choice made and 
accordingly deferred to the Commission’s judgment.93  In summary, the 
court found that the Commission not only had the authority to regulate in 
this arena, but also that the regulations themselves were reasonably tailored 
to meet the statutory objective of promoting broadband deployment and 
removing barriers to infrastructure innovation. 
B. The Common Carrier Problem 
Although the opinion thus far had been highly favorable and 
deferential to the Commission, this would change when the court addressed 
the common carrier classification issue.  In the court’s view, regulating 
broadband and mobile Internet providers as common carriers clearly 
violated the Communications Act, given that the Commission was bound 
by its own classification of broadband providers as “information services” 
rather than common carrier telecommunications services.94  Yet, as Verizon 
contended, by subjecting broadband providers to anti-blocking and anti-
discrimination requirements, the Commission was nevertheless treating 
broadband providers with the same standard of regulation they would have 
received if the Commission had classified them as common carriers in the 
first place.95 
After examining the history of what the term “common carrier” 
actually meant, the court considered the Commission’s explanation of how 
the regulations were not, in fact, treating broadband providers as common 
carriers.96  The Commission’s primary reasoning was that with respect to 
content providers, broadband ISPs were not “carriers” at all because the 
customers at issue were the end users, not the content providers.97  Under 
the Commission’s theory, because broadband ISPs could still make 
individualized decisions in determining the terms of a subscriber’s Internet 
service under the Order, the broadband providers were not engaged in 
common carriage.98  In other words, the Commission’s view was that if the 
Commission did not restrict broadband ISPs’ ability to deal on 
individualized terms with their subscribers, the Commission was not 
regulating the ISPs as common carriers.99  The court disagreed.100 
 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 650. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 651. 
 97.  Id. at 653. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
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Rather, the court relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision, Midwest 
Video II.101  Like the broadband providers’ customers in the case at bar, the 
cable operators’ primary customers in Midwest Video II were subscribers, 
and like broadband providers under the Open Internet Order, the cable 
operators were obligated to carry third-party content to customers that the 
cable operators otherwise would have been permitted to block.102  Given 
these similarities, it appeared that broadband providers were being treated 
as common carriers; a rose by any other name is, of course, still a rose.103  
Failing in this argument, the Commission offered little else to justify its 
treatment of such providers as common carriers.104 
In summation, because the majority determined that the Open Internet 
Order’s treatment of broadband providers in terms of the anti-
discrimination and anti-blocking requirements relegated the providers to 
common carrier status pro tanto, those requirements were vacated.  At the 
same time, the disclosure provision was upheld because it did not impose 
common carrier obligations on the providers and the provision was 
severable.  The majority left open the possibility that the Commission 
could modify the regulations in a permissible way to preserve the status 
quo of net neutrality.  In contrast, Senior Circuit Judge Silberman wrote a 
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, whereby he 
acknowledged that the Open Internet Order’s treatment of broadband 
providers as common carriers was impermissible, yet took the majority’s 
opinion a step further by averring that the F.C.C. had no authority to 
impose such regulations on broadband providers at all under Section 706 
and the A.P.A.105 
C. Judge Silberman’s Dissent 
Judge Silberman concurred with the majority in many respects, such 
as concluding that Section 706 is a positive grant of regulatory authority.106  
Likewise, Silberman agreed with the majority that Chevron deference to 
the Commission’s interpretation of the statutory language was warranted, 
 
 101.  440 U.S. 689 (1979) (dealing with whether cable operators should be treated as 
common carriers). 
 102.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 654. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 655.  Interestingly, the Commission never made any attempt to differentiate the 
Order’s prohibition on unreasonable discrimination from the nondiscrimination standard, which, 
by statute, applies to common carriers.  Id. at 656.  As a final inquiry, the court considered and 
rejected Verizon’s argument that the disclosure requirements were not severable from the other, 
stricken protections of Order.  Id. at 659. 
 105.  Id. (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
 106.  Id. at 660. 
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yet nonetheless opined, based on a dissection of Section 706’s language, 
that the authority could not be stretched as far as it had been.107  Ultimately, 
Silberman determined that the Commission’s treatment of broadband 
providers was impermissible.108 
Silberman concluded that the Section’s operative words granting 
regulatory authority were that the Commission may implement “measures 
that promote competition in the local telecommunications market or other 
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.”109  
Silberman accused both the Commission and the majority of conflating the 
two clauses though they have distinct functions, with the former requiring 
regulations that promote competition on price and quality among 
telecommunications providers and the latter not bearing any such 
requirement.110  Silberman’s view was that the Order must stand or fall on 
the “removing barriers” clause, because, by the Commission’s own theory, 
if it could spur demand for broadband the resulting increased investment in 
infrastructure would occur irrespective of competition.111  Vitally, however, 
the Commission had never once identified a specific practice of broadband 
providers that could be considered a barrier to investment.112 
Silberman argued that the regulation, resting on the “triple cushion 
shot”113 theory, had not been designed to promote increased competition in 
the broadband market, but rather had the stated objective of “protecting 
consumer choice, free expression, end-user control, and the ability to 
innovate without permission,” an objective that falls outside the scope of 
Section 706’s statutory authority.114  Silberman’s main critique of the 
majority’s opinion was that it was predicated on the idea that an open 
Internet would spur demand for broadband infrastructure.115  Yet, 
Silberman observed “any regulation that, in the FCC’s judgment might 
arguably make the Internet ‘better,’ could increase demand.”116  To 
Silberman’s mind, the majority’s reading of the statute would essentially 
 
 107.  Id. (“Chevron is not a wand by which courts can turn an unlawful frog into a legitimate 
prince.”) (quoting Assoc. Gas Distrib. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 108.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 667. 
 109.  Id. at 660 (emphasis supplied). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 660–661. 
 112.  Id. at 661. 
 113.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 114.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 661–662. 
 115.  Id. at 662. 
 116.  Id. 
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“free the Commission of its congressional tether” by being overbroad 
because almost any regulation could be interpreted to advance the statutory 
requirement that regulations must encourage broadband deployment, thus 
making the requirement illusory.117 
Silberman’s dissent next turned to the assertion that, even assuming 
valid authority, the Order was arbitrary and capricious in light of the fact 
that the Commission’s findings were not supported by substantial 
evidence.118  Contrary to the majority, Silberman did not believe the 
Commission had ever made any legitimate finding that broadband 
providers would or even could (technologically and economically) engage 
in discrimination and blocking of content providers were it not for the open 
Internet requirements.119  To illustrate this, Silberman stated that the 
Commission’s proffered evidence consisted primarily of “may” and 
“might” conclusory statements speculating how Internet providers would 
behave in the absence of net neutrality.120  Silberman concluded that the 
“triple cushion shot” theory rests on a faulty factual premise—that 
broadband providers have the economic clout to profitably engage in such 
discrimination and blocking as “gatekeepers” to end consumers.121  
Silberman’s view was that a consumer dissatisfied with degraded Internet 
service could simply switch to another provider with relative ease.122 
While the Commission asserted why such switching would be 
difficult, Silberman posited that such a rationale implies that broadband 
providers have market power in the industry, without actually examining 
whether they do.123  The Commission pointed to only four possible 
instances of blocking and discrimination conduct.124  Silberman concluded 
that “the Commission’s failure to conduct a market power analysis [was] 
fatal to its attempt to regulate, because it [meant] that there [was] 
inadequate evidence to support the lynchpin of the Commission’s economic 
theory.”125  Likewise, the Commission had not alleged that broadband 
 
 117.  Id.  The majority claimed there was a limitation via the Commission’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, yet Silberman dismissed this too as being an illusory restriction.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 663. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 664. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 664–65. 
 125.  Id. at 665.  Such an inquiry would necessitate a delineation of both the product and 
geographic markets in which the broadband provider is competing before making a determination 
that the market is concentrated.  Id.  A determination of the product market would not necessarily 
be limited to those companies that provide “broadband” as it is defined by the Commission; 
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providers were dividing territory and avoiding head-to-head competition; in 
some areas the opposite seemed to be true.126  Lastly, Silberman noted that 
the Justice Department had previously warned the Commission that unless 
the Commission focused its regulations on market power, any regulation 
might actually discourage broadband development.127 
V.  The Domino Effect of a Legally-Defensible Decision 
The questions Verizon v. F.C.C. raised concern issues from 
administrative stare decisis to statutory authority, antitrust market power 
analysis, and, most importantly, overall public policy.  While the judges in 
this case interpreted the letter of the law correctly (or at least reasonably), it 
is far more significant that the public is left to wonder how a lack of net 
neutrality may impact the Internet provider industry and its now potentially 
vulnerable consumers in the years to come. 
This section first addresses the concurrence in the opinion as to the 
Commission’s impermissible treatment of broadband providers as common 
carriers.  Next, this section analyzes the disagreement between the majority 
and dissent as to whether the Commission had affirmative statutory 
authority to implement the Open Internet Order.  Later, this section 
addresses whether a net neutrality regime is in the best interests of 
consumers and the market as a whole.  As a final matter, this section 
speculates on the likely outcome of the Verizon decision and the 
Commission’s—and broadband providers’—likely next move. 
A. Stare Decisis and the Common Carrier Commonality 
As an almost perfunctory matter, it bears mentioning that the 
conclusion that the Order was invalid as a technical matter was reasonable.  
Both the majority and Judge Silberman concluded that the Commission’s 
treatment of broadband providers as common carriers—after it had already 
made the determination that such providers were not common carriers—
was impermissible.128  The majority’s opinion explains that the statutory 
 
substitute products such as slower Internet service and mobile Internet service would have to be 
included because the products affect a broadband provider’s ability to raise prices.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 666. 
 127.  Id.  Judge Silberman also raised the argument that the Order granted an economic 
preference providing protection from market forces to a powerful group of constituents: Internet 
content providers.  Id. at 668.  Section 706 requires the Commission to identify an actual threat to 
competition or barrier to infrastructure investment, supported by evidence that such a threat or 
barrier exists, and if such a requirement was not met, the Commission lacked the authority to 
promulgate the regulation in the first place.  Id. at 667–68.  This theory was moot, however, 
because Silberman agreed that the Order was invalid on other grounds.  Id. at 667. 
 128.  Id. at 650, 667. 
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definition stipulates that a telecommunications carrier may be treated as a 
common carrier only to the extent that it is providing “telecommunications 
services.”129  This was problematic, given that the Commission previously 
determined130 that broadband carriers are instead providing information 
services.131  The terms of the Order prevent disparate treatment of traffic in 
substantially the same way that common carriers are prevented from 
discrimination in rendering service.132  Therefore, even though the 
Commission never expressly stated it was attempting to treat broadband 
ISPs as common carriers, it becomes clear that the Order represents a de 
facto violation of the nexus of the statutory and administrative definitions 
involved because it treats broadband providers as common carriers by 
necessary implication.133 
The court’s opinion never once uses the terms “stare decisis” or 
“estoppel,” but those are the legal principles being employed.  While the 
Commission is not necessarily bound by its own decisions as a matter of 
stare decisis,134 the Commission is bound to abide by its own definitions 
that are still in effect, which means that imposing common carrier 
obligations in broadband providers was unwarranted.135  An agency may 
not simply disregard rules or categorical delineations that are still on the 
books.136 
The principle that the Commission could change its policy to define 
broadband providers as telecommunications providers, subject to the 
constraints of the A.P.A. and the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, was 
also discussed at length in the opinion in relation to the change of 
interpretation of the Commission’s own statutory authority when it 
implemented the Order.137  The Commission would merely need to 
acknowledge and explain the reasons for reclassifying ISPs as 
telecommunications services.138  One motivation the Commission may 
 
 129.  Id. at 650; see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(51) (2012). 
 130.  See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14862 ¶ 12 (2005). 
 131.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650–58. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  See generally Honeywell Int’l., Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 628 F.3d 568 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 135.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650–58. 
 136.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1966); see also NetCoalition v. S.E.C., 615 F.3d 525, 536 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
 137.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 635–36. 
 138.  Id. at 636. 
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have had to avoid such a reclassification was that it had previously faced 
opposition to the proposal of reclassifying broadband providers as common 
carriers.139  Besides industry opposition to common carrier regulation, 
forty-eight members of Congress had requested that the Commission leave 
any such change in policy to the legislature in a 2010 congressional 
resolution.140 
By declining to officially reclassify broadband providers as common 
carriers, yet nevertheless treating them as such, the Commission found an 
inconspicuous way to treat ISPs as it desired without inviting the 
immediate ire that an outright reclassification would bring.  It is clear from 
the reasons outlined in the Verizon opinion that this arguably somewhat 
devious approach to regulation was invalid.141  The better question is 
whether the Commission had the authority to impose antidiscrimination 
and anti-blocking rules in the first place, a matter over which the majority 
and Judge Silberman disagreed.142 
B. Affirmative Statutory Authority and the Antitrust Antithesis 
It seems fairly clear that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act 
did make an implicit grant of statutory authority to the Commission to 
regulate within this arena.143  It is also not contested that the granted 
statutory authority has limitations, although the majority’s explanation of 
the extent of those limitations is somewhat unsatisfactory.144  Saying that 
the Commission is limited to its subject matter jurisdiction and that any 
regulation must encourage deployment of advanced telecommunications 
ability is indeed no limitation at all other than an illusory one.145  The 
Commission could shoehorn just about any telecommunications regulation 
into this jurisdictional scope.  This is not entirely a bad thing, however, 
since the Commission is the appointed expert on the Internet and therefore 
is better equipped to make nuanced decisions about its regulation than is 
Congress.  An alternative argument would be that although the 
Commission may have stretched the scope of its authority too far, the real 
 
 139.  H.R. Con. Res. 311, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 30, 2010).. 
 140.  John Eggerton, 48 Members of Congress Tell FCC To Back Off Broadband Action (July 
30, 2010, 5:35 PM), available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/48-
members-congress-tell-fcc-back-broadband-action/57788. 
 141.  See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650–658. 
 142.  See id. at 660–667 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
 143.  See id. at 638 (majority opinion). 
 144.  Id. at 662 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
 145.  See id. 
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problem is that the Commission was simply not given enough authority to 
regulate effectively. 
A key component of the dissent’s counterargument in this case was 
that the Commission may have overstepped its limited authority in the 
Open Internet Order because the regulation was arguably made without the 
validation of substantial evidence that there were significant barriers to 
infrastructure investment, thus rendering the regulation “arbitrary and 
capricious.”146  As to the lack of supporting evidence of any real problem 
supporting the Order’s provisions, Judge Silberman remarks in his dissent 
that the Commission never once identified any current practice of 
broadband providers that was an actual barrier to investment.147  The 
Commission did purport to show that, absent regulation, barriers to 
infrastructure and market failures might result, however.148  For example, 
the Commission stated that a broadband provider: 
may have economic incentives to block or otherwise 
disadvantage specific edge providers[,] 
might use this power to benefit its own or affiliated 
offerings at the expense of unaffiliated offerings[,] 
may act to benefit edge providers that have paid it to 
exclude rivals[,] 
may have incentives to increase revenues by charging 
edge providers[, and] 
might withhold or decline to expand capacity in order 
to ‘squeeze’ non-prioritized traffic[.]149 
As the dissent was quick to point out, these all amount to speculation, 
rather than actual evidence.150  Although these certainly represent valid 
concerns, it may be true that the evidence was too anemic to support such a 
sweeping regulation based on the current statutory authority allotted to the 
Commission.151  Specifically, if Internet providers do in fact have the 
“technical and economic” ability to impose restrictions on content 
 
 146.  See generally Hon. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Net Neutrality vs. Net Reality: Why An 
Evidence-Based Approach to Enforcement, and Not More Regulation, Could Protect Innovation 
on the Internet, 14 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 81 (2013). 
 147.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 661 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
 148.  Id. at 663. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, The Law and Economics of Network 
Neutrality, 45 IND. L. REV. 767, 811–16 (2012). 
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providers—the lynchpin of the Commission’s theory—why had they not 
done so before the Order’s implementation?152 
Surely broadband providers do have some incentives to engage in 
blocking and discrimination.153  One reason they may decline to do so is 
because of a lack of economic clout or market power.  This raises questions 
of antitrust, a body of law that often finds itself intertwined and 
occasionally adverse to administrative regulation.154  Judge Silberman 
argued that because the Commission had not conducted a market power 
analysis prior to implementing the Order, its findings were invalid.155  The 
Commission and majority both declared that ISPs represent a “terminating 
monopoly” over Internet content because Internet users tend to access the 
Internet via just one fixed provider.156  The content thus becomes 
inaccessible to them entirely when the ISP decides to act as a gatekeeper of 
specific content.157  The extent to which this represents actual market 
power depends upon the availability of other local providers, however.158 
In the earlier years of the Internet, the last-mile service of the Internet 
was something of a “natural monopoly” like that of public utility 
companies, but today it is more common for consumers to have options 
among ISPs, at least in nonrural areas.159  Whereas the majority followed 
the Commission’s belief that consumers are unlikely to respond to 
discrimination and blocking of content by switching ISPs,160 the dissent 
broadly criticized this conclusion on the grounds that switching would only 
 
 152.  See generally id. (providing a thorough analysis of this question). 
 153.  See infra Part V(C). 
 154.  See generally Babette E. L. Boliek, FCC Regulation versus Antitrust: How Net 
Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2011).  The authority to 
regulate and enforce antitrust threats granted to the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice does alleviate the F.C.C. from bearing the sole responsibility for ensuring 
that a lack of net neutrality does not result in some sort of catastrophic market failure.  See id. at 
1628. 
 155.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 665.  That said, the Commission is not the expert in ascertaining 
what constitutes impermissible market power, and therefore any antitrust-focused attempt at 
regulation might encroach on the authority of the Federal Trade Commission.  Id. 
 156.  Many, if not most, users access the Internet via both a single wireline broadband 
provider and over a separate mobile provider on smartphones.  Still, some content, such as 
Netflix, is more valuably used via wired broadband. 
 157.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646. 
 158.  See id. (“If end users could immediately respond to any given broadband provider’s 
attempt to impose restrictions on edge providers by switching broadband providers, this 
gatekeeper power might well disappear.”). 
 159.  See id. at 666. 
 160.  Id. 
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be difficult if the ISPs had real market power.161  The majority’s assertion 
that consumers would not switch providers because they would be unaware 
of such blocking or discrimination is somewhat dubious, at least as to 
major content providers like Netflix, Sykpe, Google, and Facebook.162  
Surely, in the case of one of those giants, any such degradation or blocking 
would sooner or later be covered by the media, and as a result, consumers 
could easily find out if a service had been blocked as opposed to, say, 
having been shut down.  This is less true as to smaller content providers, 
the degradation or blocking of which would be more likely to go unnoticed.  
Yet because the portion of the Order that requires disclosure of network 
management practices remains intact, an ISP’s blocking of content could 
never truly be secret—just inconspicuous.163 
At the same time, Judge Silberman makes an equally dubious 
argument when he implies that consumers would have an easy time 
switching between providers, thus rendering market power and 
concentration weak.164  This ignores the reality that in many areas 
consumers’ choices of full-fledged broadband service are quite limited.165  
One recent F.C.C. study in 2010 found that “approximately 96% of the 
population has [access to] at most two wireline providers” of Internet 
service.166  And while—given the increasing coverage and quality of 
mobile high-speed Internet—this may be based on a faulty definition of the 
relevant product market that is arguably too narrow, it is an alarming reality 
nonetheless.  Taken to its most extreme, there are some Americans who 
have only one option for wired Internet, period.  For example, citizens of 
America’s Pacific island territory of Saipan, CNMI, have only one Internet 
provider and have suffered monopolistic pricing issues as a result, a clear 
 
 161.  Id. at 664. 
 162.  See accord, Andrew Orlowski, Almost everyone read the Verizon v. FCC net neutrality 
verdict WRONG, THE REGISTER (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/ 
01/18/why_almost_everyone_got_the_net_neutrality_verdict_wrong/. 
 163.  Anyone motivated enough to seek it out this information could conclusively determine 
whether a content provider was, in fact, being blocked or degraded. 
 164.  See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 663–64 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
 165.  Id. at 665.  Silberman’s view that slower Internet providers and mobile providers reduce 
broadband providers’ market power has some flaws as well, dependent on what the specific 
consumer plans to do with his or her Internet connection.  For example, if the consumer’s sole 
reason for wanting wired Internet access is to engage in online gaming on networks such as Xbox 
Live, either substitute service provides no value, and thus does not affect the fixed-line broadband 
provider’s ability to raise prices or tamper with price structures. 
 166.  Connecting America.: The Nat’l Broadband Plan, 2010 WL 972375 (F.C.C. Mar. 16, 
2010).  The Commission cited a 2009 statistic that seventy percent of households were in areas 
where only one or two broadband providers were available when it defended its implementation 
of the Order as being supported by evidence.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 665. 
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indication of market power.167  Anywhere an Internet provider can flex its 
market power in this way is an area in which a provider could also censor 
content without economic backlash.  In any case, even Americans who live 
in areas not quite as remote suffer from a limited number of providers: If 
only two fixed broadband providers are available168 and they both 
independently or collusively decide to block and degrade certain content, 
the effect is exactly the same.  Similarly, consumers could also face 
barriers to exit in the form of early termination fees from their old provider 
and initial connection fees from any new provider, either of which might 
serve to deter switching. 
In summation, Judge Silberman’s objection to the Commission’s 
failure to establish the market power of broadband providers is a valid one.  
However, because the market for broadband Internet service is highly 
concentrated for many consumers, the Order addressed a legitimate 
concern.  In other words, even though the Commission may have exceeded 
its authority with the Order, or at the very least did not implement it 
properly with prior-established evidence, the Order’s mandate of net 
neutrality may yet be sound because it addresses a number of potential 
market failures. 
C. Problematic Public Policy? 
Looking at the technical and textual statutory authority and stare 
decisis issues at hand, the court’s decision in this case seems wholly 
proper.  Regardless of the wisdom of the regulation, it was the court’s task 
to affirm or vacate the Order based on its legal validity.169  That said, the 
court’s opinion does little to address the far more compelling question at 
hand: whether net neutrality is good public policy.  Throughout its young 
existence, the Internet has proved to be an admirably level playing field 
where small start-ups often supplant established players (i.e., Facebook 
replacing MySpace).  In a regulatory scheme that allows for paid 
prioritization, start-ups—and particularly bandwidth-intensive start-ups— 
will likely find themselves unable to put forth the capital necessary to 
 
 167.  Telephone Interview with Ghassan Harb, Consumer Counsel at the Att’y Gen.’s Off. of 
the Commonwealth of the N. Mar. I. (Feb. 24, 2014).  As an aside, this and other U.S. island 
territories such as American Samoa are areas where telecommunications infrastructure investment 
is currently severely lacking.  Michael Calabrese et. al., The Most Expensive Internet in America, 
SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (May 24, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/05/24/ 
internet_access_and_cost_in_american_samoa_northern_marianas_islands_guam_.html. 
 168.  The presence of mobile broadband changes the market power analysis to mean such a 
scenario is not quite a duopoly, yet there are still services for which mobile broadband access is 
ineffective.  See supra note 165. 
 169.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 634–35. 
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obtain a level of service similar to that of established competitors and 
therefore may never get off the ground. 
Content providers are concerned that in the absence of an open 
Internet their content will be blocked or degraded, that it will encourage 
ISPs to further vertically integrate into content and applications, and that it 
will contribute to the diminution of free speech on the Internet.170  At the 
heart of this debate is that ISPs essentially want a “piece of the pie” from 
any content provider making money on the Internet via the ISP’s 
network.171  If cable companies can charge video aggregators like Netflix, 
YouTube, and Hulu, or communications providers like Skype, a fee in 
order to avoid being blocked or degraded (a sort of now-legal extortion), 
those companies will respond by passing along costs to the consumer or 
inserting even more advertisements than they already do.172 
Netflix publicizes the performance speeds it receives from various 
broadband providers, and upon examination the graphical data does seem 
to indicate that the streaming service is being forced via degraded service 
into making special paid arrangements with ISPs.173  To be fair, streaming 
video providers comprise some of the most expensive content for 
broadband providers to carry because they are invariably bandwidth 
intensive.  Netflix alone was reported to account for roughly thirty percent 
of downstream Internet traffic.174  Likewise, if broadband providers 
continue to be forced to abide by open Internet practices, they might simply 
begin charging more for their own services, meaning that added costs 
arising out of the increasingly bandwidth-intensive ways in which the 
average consumer uses the Internet are somewhat unavoidable.175  Still, 
there are other, more worrying, potential market failures here. 
 
 170.  Ohlhausen, supra note 146 at 81. 
 171.  Colbert Report: Interview with Tim Wu (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 23, 
2014), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/432449/january-23-
2014/end-of-net-neutrality—-tim-wu. 
 172.  See id. 
 173.  Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Ep. 5: Net Neutrality (HBO broadcast June 1, 
2014), available at http://www.hbo.com/last-week-tonight-with-john-oliver/episodes/01/5-june-1-
2014/video/net-neutrality.html#/ (“[The cable company’s treatment of Netflix] has all the 
ingredients of a mob shake-down.”). 
 174.  Tracey Lien, Why a Deal Between Netflix and Comcast Matters to Gamers, POLYGON 
(Mar. 13, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://www.polygon.com/2014/3/13/5483184/why-a-deal-between-
netflix-and-comcast-matters-to-gamers. 
 175.  See Gary Kim, Globally, Bandwidth Consumption Continues to Double Every Two 
Years, TECHZONE360 http://www.techzone360.com/topics/techzone/articles/2012/07/18/ 
299247-globally-bandwidth-consumption-continues-double-every-two-years.htm (July 18, 2012) 
(explaining global bandwidth demand roughly doubles every two years). 
11-3 MACROED HURST ARTICLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2014  4:47 PM 
68 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:1 
Some commentators have argued that cable companies in particular 
may have a more nefarious reason to want to degrade or block content, and 
especially video streaming content: eliminating competition.  In many ways 
video aggregators like Netflix and Hulu Plus are formidable rivals to cable 
companies.176  An increasing number of Americans have switched off 
cable, finding entertainment in online video sources instead.177  Hulu in 
particular, a joint venture of three of the major broadcast television 
networks,178 could be perceived as a threat because it offers much of the 
same content people pay to view on cable with the added convenience of 
being on demand and usually available the morning after a show airs.179  
Likewise, many cable providers offer their own on-demand video services, 
sometimes for a fee.180  Moreover, some cable companies already pay 
additional fees to cable networks to ensure that only cable subscribers can 
view certain content on those networks’ websites,181 indicating a 
willingness to cut deals with video content providers.  That said, while it is 
one thing to say that cable companies providing broadband could block or 
degrade competing video aggregators and other sources of streaming video, 
it is another thing to say that they actually would, given market pressures 
and the potential that gains from blocking might be offset by losses in 
demand for the provider’s Internet service.182 
 
 176.  Aaron Taube, Proof That Netflix is Destroying Cable TV, YAHOO FINANCE (Apr. 16, 
2014, 7:07 PM), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/proof-netflix-destroying-cable-tv-000400548. 
html (noting subscribers to Netflix and Hulu Plus were reported to be three times as likely to not 
have a cable subscription). 
 177.  Richard Davies, More Consumers Cut the Cable Cord, ABC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2014, 
9:01 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2014/03/more-consumers-cut-the-cable-cord/ 
(stating that 2013 marked the first year ever that pay-TV operators reported an annual decline in 
the number of subscribers, indicative of the consumer trend of “cord cutting”). 
 178.  These are NBC Universal, News Corp. (Fox), and Walt Disney Co. (ABC).  See Boliek, 
supra note 154 at n. 248. 
 179.  Associated Press, Hulu names Fox exec as CEO, NEW YORK POST (Oct. 17, 2013, 
10:04 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/10/17/hulu-names-fox-exec-as-ceo/. 
 180.  One such example is Xfinity Streampix, a paid service offered by Comcast that is meant 
to compete with Netflix, Amazon Instant Video, and Hulu.  Trefis Team, The Latest Deal With 
Sony Pictures Highlights Comcast’s Efforts To Push Its On-Demand and Streaming Services, 
FORBES (Mar. 3, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/03/12/the-
latest-deal-with-sony-pictures-highlights-comcasts-efforts-to-push-its-on-demand-and-streaming-
services/. 
 181.  Dorothy Pomerantz, ESPN Tries To Have It Both Ways, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014, 4:43 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/2014/01/27/espn-tries-to-have-it-both-ways/. 
 182.  See Boliek, supra note 154, at n. 243.  It is also worth noting that if blocking did induce 
people to unsubscribe from a cable company’s Internet service, it could also induce them to 
switch television providers at the same time, resulting in further losses. 
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The same possible market failure exists with cable and DSL 
broadband providers vis-à-vis an alternative communications service like 
Skype, which competes with traditional phone services typically provided 
by those same companies.  Given that the residential landline telephone is 
falling into near irrelevance,183 however, this is a somewhat petty concern.  
A more compelling concern would be about how mobile broadband 
providers might want to block Skype because its voice and video service 
competes with the original use of the cellular telephone.  The evidence 
would suggest that on the contrary, mobile carriers have embraced Skype, 
however.184 
The anticompetitive argument proposed by net neutrality advocates, 
which is not without its faults,185 may be magnified when it comes to one 
broadband provider in particular: Comcast.  The company recently 
vertically integrated to acquire NBC Universal (owner of NBC and a host 
of cable networks) from General Electric and thus faces competition from 
streaming video available online in more ways than usual.186  Net neutrality 
was, not surprisingly, a key inquiry in the F.C.C.’s review and eventual 
approval of that acquisition.187  Additionally, Comcast later made a bid to 
acquire Time Warner Cable, which could make the company the broadband 
provider for roughly one third of American households.188  Comcast is a 
powerful player not just in the market, but politically too; the company 
spent an astonishing $18,810,000 on lobbying during 2013.189  This would 
seem to make Comcast a particularly frightening potential abuser of market 
power.  However, under a consent decree related to its acquisition of NBC 
 
 183.  Just 71% of households had a landline telephone in 2011, a number that has likely 
declined further since then while cell phone ownership has soared and does not speak to how 
much those landlines are actually used.  Jeffrey Sparshott, More People Say Goodbye to Their 
Landlines, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2013, 7:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001 
424127887323893004579057402031104502. 
 184.  See Ryan Singel, Verizon Embraces Skype on Smartphones, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2010, 
1:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/02/verizon-embraces-skype-on-smart-phones/. 
 185.  Indeed, there is a fairly cogent argument that the ex post “wait and see” approach of 
antitrust law is a far more efficient market control measure than is ex ante regulation, because 
regulation runs the risk of forbidding not just anti-competitive but also pro-competitive practices 
and may stifle innovation.  Boliek, supra note 154, at 1681–82. 
 186.  In the Matter of Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. &  NBC Universal, Inc., 
26 F.C.C. Rec. 4238, 4352-53 (2011). 
 187.  Id. at 4351. 
 188.  Dawn C. Chmielewski, Comcast-Time Warner Cable deal may heighten calls for net 
neutrality, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/13/ 
entertainment/la-et-ct-comcast-merger-net-neutrality-20140213. 
 189.  Robert Reich, Antitrust in the New Gilded Age, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014, 9:20 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/comcast-time-warner_b_5166292.html. 
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Universal, Comcast agreed to abide by net neutrality principles until 2017, 
an agreement that remains in place even though the Open Internet Order 
was struck down.190  So at least for the next few years, Comcast’s 
subscribers (and Time Warner’s subscribers if the deal goes through) will 
have their worries about the outcome of the Verizon case mitigated, 
although the agreement has not stopped Comcast from entering a streaming 
deal with Netflix.191 
Although evidence of broadband providers actually blocking 
competing content is somewhat scarce, for evidence that they might engage 
in such practices if permitted one need look no further than the smartphone 
application blocking that has been done by Verizon itself in the past.  In 
2012, Verizon accepted a $1.25 million settlement with the F.C.C. after it 
impermissibly blocked various “tethering” applications that competed with 
the carrier’s own mobile hotspot service.192  Likewise, cable networks and 
cable providers are no stranger to arranging for a type of permissible 
blocking of their own.193  Cable television networks have worked with 
cable companies to ensure that the videos provided on many cable 
channel’s websites and apps do not cannibalize one of their primary 
revenue sources—the fees collected from cable providers to carry the 
network.  The networks do this by requiring online viewers to authenticate 
that they have a cable subscription with a participating cable company 
before they are allowed to watch.194 
In the wake of its victory in Verizon v. F.C.C., Verizon publically 
stated that it has been and remains committed to an open Internet and that 
the court’s decision had not changed this.195  But if Verizon did not want to 
operate outside the rules of net neutrality, why would it have bothered with 
the trouble and expense of this lawsuit in the first place?  Indeed, Verizon 
expressly told the court in this proceeding that if it were not for the open 
Internet rules, “[it] would be exploring . . . commercial arrangements [with 
 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text. 
 192.  Peter Svenssen, Verizon Can’t Block Tethering Apps Says FCC; Carrier Pays to Settle 
Probe, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/31/ 
verizon-cant-block-tethering-apps_n_1725466.html. 
 193.  See, e.g., Dorothy Pomerantz, ESPN Tries to Have It Both Ways, FORBES (Jan. 27, 
2014, 4:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/2014/01/27/espn-tries-to-have-
it-both-ways/. 
 194.  Id.  ESPN’s strategy is to charge cable companies that want their subscribers to have 
access to its app an extra fee.  Id.  Note that ESPN is already the most expensive channel for cable 
companies to carry.  Id. 
 195.  Edward Wyatt, Rebuffing F.C.C. in ‘Net Neutrality’ Case, Court Allows Streaming 
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at B1, available at http://nyti.ms/1cjrF1t. 
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services like Netflix],”196 and it since has.197  Verizon claimed to the public 
that it merely wanted to manage its network in the way it saw fit.198  In a 
press release, Verizon further stated that the decision would allow 
“broadband providers to offer new and innovative services to their 
customers,” that it would allow “more room for innovation,” and that it 
would keep the Internet “a of hub of innovation.”  This prompted talk show 
host Stephen Colbert to sarcastically quip, “See, net neutrality’s only been 
dead a week, and already three innovative uses of the word 
‘innovation.’”199  The innovation of which Verizon spoke presumably 
means new billing practices, a shift that has the potential to spell bad news 
for consumers. 
Another possible shortfall of the new regulatory scheme, or lack 
thereof, is that it could result in degradation beyond just those services that 
involve streaming video.  Although it is sheer speculation, the majority 
theorized that an Internet provider could accept payment from content 
rivals to degrade a competitor,200 e.g., degrading or blocking Bing if 
Google paid it to do so.  This concern becomes even more relevant in light 
of the vertical integration that has already taken place in the industry.201  
Google recently vertically integrated to make the foray into providing 
Internet service via Google Fiber.202  On the one hand, the emergence of 
Google as a provider softens cable and DSL broadband providers’ potential 
market power.203  On the other hand, Google has incentive to degrade the 
service of a competitor like Bing, or the competitor of any one of its 
various services, like Google Plus and its thus-far inauspicious attempt to 
compete with Facebook.204  Likewise, Comcast now owns NBC Universal 
 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Several months later, Netflix begrudgingly agreed to a paid peering deal with Verizon.  
Sam Gustin, Netflix Pays Verizon in Streaming Deal, Following Comcast Pact, TIME (Apr. 28, 
2014), http://ti.me/1pHVPrT. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Stephen Colbert, End of Net Neutrality, COLBERT REPORT (Comedy Central broadcast 
Jan. 23, 2014). 
 200.  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 629. 
 201.  See, e.g., Rick Busciglio, Comcast acquires 100 percent of NBC Universal, 
Examiner.com (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/comcast-acquires-100-percent-
of-nbc-universal. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See id. 
 204.  See Daniel Sparks, Facebook Inc. Isn’t Overvalued: Here’s Why the Doubters Are 
Wrong, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/04/02/a-
closer-look-at-facebook-incs-greatest-competitiv.aspx. 
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and therefore is also a part owner of MSNBC,205 and without net neutrality 
it could, in theory, block or degrade the websites of competing firms such 
as Fox News or CNN.  At that point, the issue starts to evolve into one of 
free speech and censorship.206  In any case, a lack of net neutrality 
represents at best a “mixed bag” practice and at worst a potentially massive 
market failure should the fears of net neutrality advocates actually come to 
pass. 
D. An Uncertain Future 
Contrary to the expectations of many, the Commission ended up 
deciding not to appeal the Verizon v. F.C.C. case to the Supreme Court.207  
F.C.C. chairmen Tom Wheeler had previously said the Commission might 
appeal the decision at the time it was released, although he may not have 
ever planned to do so, given that he had previously voiced support for the 
idea of allowing Internet providers to experiment with new business 
models.208  Wheeler, a former telecommunications industry insider, said at 
the time that the Commission would be developing new rules to replace the 
Order.209  The Commission did later propose a new set of net neutrality 
regulations several months later in May 2014, albeit a fairly anemic set that 
allowed for so-called “Internet fast lanes” where content providers could 
pay ISPs for preferential treatment.210 
The post net neutrality marketplace is still very much nascent, but 
some evidence of newly-permitted practices by ISPs have already emerged.  
Comcast recently inked a deal with Netflix to allow faster, smoother 
streaming.211  Netflix had previously complained that streaming speeds on 
Comcast were starting to lag behind those on other ISPs, sparking 
 
 205.  Mike Segar, Comcast buys Microsoft stake in MSNBC.com, REUTERS (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/16/us-msnbc-microsoft-idUSBRE86F04W20120716. 
 206.  If successful, a merger of Comcast and Time Warner would yield a disturbing amount 
of influence over speech coming from movie studios, television producers, and news 
organizations, given that all those industries would have to rely on the combined organization to 
get their messages to the general public.  Reich, supra note 189. 
 207.  James P. Tuthill, FCC throws in the towel, but public has right to know why, SFGATE 
(Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/FCC-throws-in-the-towel-but-public-has-
right-to-5267613.php. 
 208.  Edward Wyatt, Rebuffing F.C.C. in ‘Net Neutrality’ Case, Court Allows Streaming 
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at B1, available at http://nyti.ms/1cjrF1t.  This represents a 
shift from Wheeler’s predecessor, who implemented the Open Internet Order.  Id. 
 209.  Tuthill, supra note 207. 
 210.  See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet NPRM, FCC 14-61 (2014 (available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/protecting-and-promoting-open-internet-nprm (last visited Oct. 26, 2014)). 
 211.  Chloe Albanesius, Comcast, Netflix Ink Deal to Improve Streaming Speeds, PC 
MAGAZINE (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2453878,00.asp. 
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accusations that Comcast was deliberately stifling Netflix traffic to extort 
payment from the video aggregator.212  The deal requires Netflix to pay for 
use of Comcast’s network and presumably allows Comcast subscribers to 
view Netflix’s new Ultra High Definition content, a service that Netflix so 
far has only provided to ISPs that participate in its Open Connect 
Network.213  That network allows Netflix to connect directly to ISPs or 
embed its content servers inside an ISP’s network, thus eliminating 
middleman backbone networks.214  Comcast has said that Netflix will still 
not receive preferential network treatment, as doing so would violate its 
consent decree,215 but the arrangement and others like it—such as the one 
recently inked by Verizon216—are nonetheless suspect.217 
VI.  Conclusion 
It is certainly rare for a Circuit Court case over an administrative order 
within the telecommunications industry to invoke such strong feelings on 
either side of the debate,218 yet Verizon v. F.C.C. is no ordinary case 
because net neutrality is no ordinary issue.219  The ways in which this 
decision could spell bad news for consumers are myriad.  Content 
providers may start paying fees for preferred service, which in turn would 
result in higher costs for those services passed on to the consumer.  
Furthermore, net neutrality previously allowed anyone to become a content 
producer by leveling the playing field, which is pivotal to ensuring 
innovative newcomers are not boxed out by established content providers 
 
 212.  See Lien, supra note 174. 
 213.  Albanesius, supra note 211. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 216.  See Gustin, supra note 197. 
 217.  Lien, supra note 174 (“Netflix is conceding they have to do this, that they cannot 
survive as an Internet content provider without paying the cable companies a fee.”). 
 218.  Indeed, talk show host John Oliver made light of the disinterest most people have for 
things like the minutiae of F.C.C. regulations when he did a segment on his show about net 
neutrality and its recent shake-up, theorizing that net neutrality’s esoteric nature had shielded it 
from greater public outcry.  Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Ep. 5: Net Neutrality (HBO 
broadcast June 1, 2014), available at http://www.hbo.com/last-week-tonight-with-john-
oliver/episodes/01/5-june-1-2014/video/net-neutrality.html#/ (“The cable companies have figured 
out the great truth of America: If you want to do something evil, put it inside something boring.”). 
 219.  It would seem that the public, once educated on the issue, is quite opinionated about Net 
Neutrality and the F.C.C.’s new proposed rules.  The Commission received over a million comments to 
its proposed rules, a record number and a volume so high it caused the F.C.C.’s website to crash.  See 
Elise Hu, One Million Net Neutrality Comments Filed, but Will They Matter?, National Public Radio, 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/07/21/332678802/one-million-net-
neutralitycomments-filed-but-will-they-matter (last accessed Oct. 26, 2014). 
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who see them as a threat.  Simply put, the Internet was not broken before, 
and yet it may be now. 
At the same time, despite the sensationalist speech on this issue being 
disseminated to the public,220 one must be careful not to overreact.  It may 
be that many of those notions of a dystopian future for cyberspace are 
unlikely to come to pass in most areas due to normal market pressures and 
the still-present and potent force that is federal antitrust law.  Indeed, 
prophylactic authority in this arena is actually somewhat dispersed: the 
protections put in place by the F.T.C. and Department of Justice that guard 
against market failures are unaffected by this decision, meaning the market 
is not completely vulnerable.  Perhaps this window of opportunity for 
broadband providers to experiment with “innovative” business models—
which will be open at least until the Commission approves a new set of 
rules in accordance with the court’s decision—is a good thing because it 
could partially settle the net neutrality debate.  Conversely, if the 
Commission ultimately fails to adopt another net neutrality regulation, this 
interim period of free experimentation could become permanent, for better 
or worse. 
The seminal question is an age-old one that is raised whenever there is 
a potential for market failures: whether the laissez-faire open market or 
effective regulation is the means to an optimally efficient result.  It may 
very well be true, as some have posited, that addressing any market failures 
from an absence of net neutrality is more efficiently left to the “wait and 
see” approach of antitrust law than ex ante regulation.221  Moreover, one 
may argue that it is inefficient and unavailing to attempt to closely regulate 
such a rapidly changing industry where technological innovations routinely 
alter the competitive landscape.  Indeed, the Commission should be 
cautious about forming regulations based on concerns of undue market 
power because it is not the designated expert in that field.222  The answer to 
the question of what solution is optimal will take time to flesh out if it is 
ever reached at all.  In the meantime, however, the future of the Internet—
which is itself a symbol and embodiment of the principles of future 
progress, innovation, and competitive fair play—hangs in the balance. 
 
 
 220.  This includes predictions of a populist revolt.  See, e.g., Ron Fournier, Net Neutrality’s Death 
Could Spark Populist Revolt, NATIONAL JOURNAL (May 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/net-neutrality-s-death-could-spark-populist-revolt-
20140506?ocid=msnnws (suggesting Comcast or Verizon might be this generation’s Standard Oil). 
 221.  See Boliek, supra note 154 at 1681–82. 
 222.  See generally id. 
